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For nearly two centuries American law required that one spouse
prove that the other was guilty of wrongful conduct before a divorce
would be granted. The spouse seeking the divorce usually had to prove
not only the other's fault, but his own blamelessness as well. Although in
the era following World War II there has been a strong trend away from
this concept of fault, Pennsylvania remains an outstanding exception.
This article briefly reviews the history of divorce law in America, citing
the Pennsylvania statutes as an example of the approach that predomi-
nated through the middle of the twentieth century. Pennsylvania's present
divorce laws are contrasted with the more liberal "no-fault" approach
taken by the vast majority of the states.
II. The Evolution of Divorce Law in the United States
Divorce in Pennsylvania, as elsewhere in the United States, is
strictly statutory, and the power to regulate marriage and divorce is
reserved to the states as part of their police power. The states' monopoly
with respect to termination of marriages and their virtually absolute
power to prescribe the means whereby a divorce may be granted have
been consistently upheld.'
The state is an "unnamed third party" in divorce actions because of
its overriding interest in promoting the public welfare by encouraging
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1. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
family stability. Early attacks upon the constitutionality of divorce laws
focused upon the contractual aspects of marriage-the rights of parties to
a contract in general and the constitutional prohibition against impairment
of contracts. These arguments were uniformly rejected on the theory that
the contractual aspects of marriage are peripheral considerations and that
marriage is actually a status, relationship, or institution in which the state
has important interests. An example of this interpretation can be found in
Maynard v. Hill,2 in which the United States Supreme Court upheld a
divorce enacted by the legislative assembly of the territory of Washington
as a valid exercise of legislative power. The actual issue before the Court
was title to a territorial land grant made to the husband subsequent to the
legislative divorce. Determinative of the issue of title was the validity of
the divorce, which the husband had obtained by legislative act, without
notice to the wife, after he had deserted her some years previously. The
wife's heirs argued unsuccessfully that the divorce act constituted a law
impairing the marriage contract of the parties.
At present, by mandate of the Pennsylvania Constitution, only the
courts are empowered to terminate marriages, 3 and this power is strictly
limited by the legislature to certain enumerated grounds and other re-
quirements.' The source of legislative power with regard to termination
of marriages is found in the British legal tradition, which the colonial
legislatures and assemblies continued with some essential adaptations.
The legislative power to terminate marriages developed of necessity to fill
a void resulting from the limitations of the English ecclesiastical courts.
Although marriage and divorce were within the purview of the Church
and, therefore, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical
courts, the latter applied only canon law and could not terminate mar-
riages. The ecclesiastical courts could grant a divorce a mensa et thoro,
divorce from bed and board amounting to a judicially-approved separa-
tion. A marriage could also be annulled if it was void as a result of
pre-existing disabilities, but in such case the marriage was set aside or
"avoided," not terminated. Only Parliament could, and did, grant di-
vorces a vinculo matrimonii, absolute divorces terminating existing
marriages.
As a consequence of the parliamentary tradition, the early colonists
apparently viewed divorce as a natural subject for the exercise of legisla-
tive power. The colonial assemblies assumed jurisdiction over divorce
and annulment of marriage, but there was one important difference
between the colonial assemblies, or the early state legislatures, and
2. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888). In Maynard, the Supreme Court sets forth a
thorough discussion of legislative divorces in the United States.
3. See PA. CONST. art. 3, § 32 (1967) (prohibits special laws). See note 7 infra.
4. The divorce laws of Pennsylvania are codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §§ 1-98
(Purdon 1955). Specific grounds for divorce are set forth in PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 10
(Purdon 1955).
Parliament. Parliament functioned as a judicial tribunal as well as a
legislature. It became necessary for the early Pennsylvania legislatures to
perform some of the functions of a court, such as investigation and fact
finding with regard to petitions for divorce.
In England, divorces continued to be granted by private act of
Parliament until 1857, when the Matrimonial Causes Act was enacted.
5
There were a number of divorces granted, or, more precisely, enacted by
the Pennsylvania legislature on a variety of grounds. Frequently the
grounds were not specified in the legislative act and the terms divorce and
annulment were often used interchangeably. It is apparent that there
remained some difficulty with regard to the concept of terminating a
marriage while acknowledging its validity. The ingrained belief that a
marriage could not be terminated unless it was somehow defective is
reflected in the use of annulment language in the divorce acts.
6
The legislature's power to enact divorces was curtailed by the
constitution of 1838, which vested power in the courts to terminate
marriages in enumerated cases. Article I, section 14 of the Constitution of
Pennsylvania, as amended in 1838, provided that "the legislature shall
not have power to enact laws annulling the contract of marriage in any
case where, by law, the courts of this Commonwealth are, or may
hereafter be empowered to decree a divorce."
7
After 1838 the legislature, as well as the courts, assumed by implica-
tion that while the legislature could no longer enact divorces on the
enumerated grounds, in other cases legislative action was proper. The
result was overlapping jurisdiction in divorce cases, which a number of
litigants interpreted as providing them with a choice of forum.
In Jones v. Jones,8 an action in ejectment, ownership of real estate
turned upon the validity of an act of assembly terminating the marriage
between the parties. The evidence before the supreme court revealed that
several years prior to the petition for a legislative divorce, the plaintiff-
wife had instituted divorce proceedings in the appropriate court on
grounds of indignities and cruel treatment, but because she was unable to
meet her burden 6f proof, a verdict had been rendered for the defendant-
husband. The supreme court ruled that the denial of a divorce by the
proper court did not necessarily preclude a petition to the legislature for a
divorce asserting grounds other than those specifically placed within the
jurisdiction of the court. 9
5. Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857, 20 & 21 Vict., c. 85.
6. See PA. STAT ANN- tit. 23, §§ 10(l)(b) and (g) (Purdon 1955), which establishes
bigamy and fraud as grounds for divorce. Both of these grounds constitute a basis for
annulment pursuant to PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 12 (Purdon 1955).
7. PA. CONST. art. 1, § 14 (1938)(amended 1874 and 1967). The Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion no longer contains such an express prohibition. The quoted provision was deleted and a
provision prohibiting enactment of special laws was adopted in 1967. See PA. CONST. art. 3, §
32.
8. 12 Pa. 350 (1849).
9. Id. at 357.
The law enacted by the legislature to divorce the parties in Cronise
v. Cronise10 survived attack in the courts because plaintiff had sought and
obtained a divorce that did not fall within one of the enumerated grounds
reserved to the courts. The supreme court found, as had the legislature,
that plaintiff-wife was sufficiently deserving of the relief that a divorce
would afford her even though she would have been denied a divorce had
she instituted her proceedings in the courts rather than in the legislature.
Legislative divorces continued to be available on a limited basis until
they were prohibited by the constitution of 1874.11 The abolition of
divorce by legislative enactment was almost universally viewed as a
reform that would avoid many abuses that had previously occurred. One
such abuse was highlighted by the Cronise case: defendant-husband, who
had successfully opposed the divorce action in the courts, had stated that
he would have defended in the legislature as well had he been notified of
the proceedings. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that notice was
not necessary because the legislative divorce was a law and not a
decree.' 
2
III. Pennsylvania Divorce Law-From Pre-Revolution to the Present
The legal principles that govern the Pennsylvania divorce statutes
today were first enunciated in 1785.13 Pennsylvania divorce law is de-
rived almost entirely from the law of eighteenth century Scotland. For
example, the penal provision prohibiting the marriage of a defendant in a
successful action for divorce on grounds of adultery to a named co-
respondent during the life of the injured spouse is assumed to have been
derived from the Scottish oath of calumny.
14
The first divorce code enacted in Pennsylvania, the Act of 1785,5
provided for divorce from the bonds of matrimony on the grounds of
impotency, bigamy, adultery, desertion, or marriage on false rumor of
death. A bed and board divorce could be obtained by a wife on the
additional grounds of abandonment, cruel and barbarous treatment, or
indignities to the person. This divorce law was recodified by the Act of
1815,16 which reduced the desertion period to two years and added cruel
and barbarous treatment and indignities as grounds for divorce from bed
and board for a husband as well as a wife. The present divorce law 17 made
relatively little change in the substance of the Act of 1815, which was
only a slight modification of the Act of 1785.
10. 54 Pa. 255 (1867).
11. PA, CONST. art. 3, § 7 (1874) (amended and renumbered as art. 3, § 32 (1967)).
12. Cronise v. Cronise, 54 Pa. 255, 262 (1867).
13. An Act Concerning Divorces and Alimony, c. 1187, 12 Pa. Stat. 94 (1785).
14. See Garrat v. Garrat, 4 Yeates 243 (Pa. 1805).
15. See note 13 supra.
16. Act of March 13, 1815, P.L. 150 No. -.
17. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §§ 1-98 (Purdon 1955).
The only successful attempt to reform the divorce laws, albeit a
minor one, culminated in an amendment to the divorce law in 1972. The
amendment provides that if the defendant is insane or has a serious mental
disorder that results in confinement in a mental institution and there is no
reasonable, foreseeable prospect of his or her being discharged from
in-patient care, a divorce can be granted.' 8 This represents a change from
the prior law that insanity was not a ground for divorce and that when an
action was brought against a hopelessly insane person it had to be based
upon some statutory ground that arose before the defendant became
insane. !9
Pennsylvania is one of only three states that still require, except in
case of hopeless mental illness, that one party prove the other to have
been at fault in the marriage. 2" All of the other states permit a divorce on
the grounds of incompatibility of the parties. Incompatibility is clearly
not a ground for divorce in Pennsylvania. Domestic infelicity, intemper-
ance, inconvenience or mistreatment as a result of ill health, domestic
differences, trivial altercations, incompatibility of temperament, petty
irritations, frequent refusal of intercourse or failure to perform household
duties have been held not to be indignities and are not otherwise grounds
for divorce in Pennsylvania. 21 Judge Spaeth has succinctly explained the
requirement of fault that is basic to Pennsylvania divorce law:
[T]he right to obtain a divorce in Pennsylvania is defined in
punitive terms, which apply to both parties: one who commits
any of certain enumerated wrongs may be punished by being
divorced from his or her spouse; the punishment may be ex-
acted, however, only by one who is innocent.
2
If both parties are nearly equally at fault, so that neither can clearly be
said to be the innocent and injured spouse, Pennsylvania will grant the
divorce to neither.
23
18. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 10 (Purdon 1976). The requirements under the new
provision are strict, however, and few plaintiffs will be able to obtain a divorce on this
ground. The defendant must have been confined in a mental institution for at least three
.years prior to the filing of the complaint in divorce and there must be "no reasonably
foreseeable prospect of the defendant spouse's being discharged from inpatient care during
the next three years subsequent to the filing of the complaint." These facts must be certified
by the superintendent of the institution and supported by a statement of the treating
physician. Experience has indicated that few physicians are willing to predict the future of a
mentally ill individual.
19. Boyer v. Boyer, 163 Pa. Super. Ct. 520, 63 A.2d 187 (1940).
20. The other two states are Illinois and South Dakota.
21. See Matobcik v. Matobcik, 173 Pa. Super. Ct. 267, 98 A.2d 238 (1953); Cowher v.
Cowher, 172 Pa. Super. Ct. 989, 1 A.2d 304 (1952); Stewart v. Stewart, 171 Pa. Super. Ct.
218, 90 A.2d 402 (1952); Kranch v. Kranch, 170 Pa. Super. Ct. 169, 84 A.2d 230 (1951). See
also Teitelbaum, The Pennsylvania Divorce Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, p. 343 (introduction
to the Title 23) noting that "[uinhappiness, incompatibility, lack of harmony and other such
matters which indicate misalliances are not sufficient for divorce."
22. Steinke v. Steinke, 238 Pa. Super. Ct. 74, 92,357 A. 2d 674, 683 (1975) (Spaeth, J.,
concurring in result).
23. See, e.g., Hepworth v. Hepworth, 129 Pa. Super. Ct. 360, 195 A. 924 (1937).
Today nearly all divorce actions in Pennsylvania are brought on the
grounds of indignities. Indignities represent a catch-all that not only
includes actions on the part of the guilty spouse such as "vulgarity,
unmerited reproach, studied neglect, ridicule and abusive language,"
2 4
but can include other grounds for divorce, such as adultery, or cruel and
barbarous treatment. 25 The party bringing the divorce action will rarely
limit himself to one of these other statutory grounds because they can be
incorported within a case of indignities, whereupon the party can bring in
evidence of other mistreatment by the spouse in addition to evidence
supporting the more specific ground.
The courts have been strict in their interpretation of what constitutes
indignities. A party seeking a divorce on this ground must show that he
has been subjected to a course of behavior that is humiliating and
degrading, making his life intolerable and burdensome. A single act is not
sufficient; there must be a continuous course of mistreatment.2 6 The cited
actions must have manifested the spirit of malevolence, hate and es-
trangement that is central to a charge of indignities.27
In recent years, the courts have found themselves caught between
Scylla and Charybdis when interpreting the present Pennsylvania divorce
code. On the one hand they are faced with strict precedential interpreta-
tions requiring the degree of hatred and estrangement discussed above.
On the other hand, they are often faced with records that they feel require
that plaintiff be granted a divorce if at all possible.
A classic example of this dilemma is found in Steinke v. Steinke. 
28
Shortly after the Steinkes were married, the husband informed his wife
that he never wanted to grow up. He started wearing diapers and rubber
pants. Nine months after the parties were married, a daughter was born
and the husband stopped wearing diapers, but he then expressed a desire
to dress as a woman. With the help of hormone pills he began to assume
the identity and appearance of a woman, at work and in public as well as
at home. He applied for an operation to transform his sex, but after a
period of time was advised by the physician that he was not a proper
candidate. He soon stopped the treatments and, feeling himself cured,
resumed living as a man. At about the same time, his wife filed a
complaint in divorce alleging indignities. The lower court refused to grant
the divorce because the husband's conduct stemmed from a psychiatric
disorder, and mental illness has always been a valid defense to any
24. Patton v. Patton, 183 Pa. Super. Ct. 468, 132 A.2d 915 (1957).
25. See Foley v. Foley, 188 Pa. Super. Ct. 292, 146 A.2d 328 (1959) (adultery, among
other acts, as indignities); Robinson v. Robinson, 183 Pa. Super. Ct. 574, 133 A.2d 259
(1957) (cruel and barbarous treatment).
26. Commonwealth ex rel. Whitney v. Whitney, 160 Pa. Super. Ct. 224, 228, 50 A.2d
732, 734 (1947).
27. Barr v. Barr, 232 Pa. Super. Ct. 9, 331 A.2d 774 (1974); Sells v. Sells, 228 Pa.
Super. Ct. 331, 323 A.2d 20 (1974).
28. 238 Pa. Super. Ct. 74, 357 A.2d 674 (1975).
accusation of indignities. The superior court, on the horns of a dilemma,
reversed, holding that the husband's predilection was "the indulgence of
a private fantasy" rather than a product of mental illness.
29
Judge Spaeth stated in a thoughtful concurring opinion3° that the
majority had reached a humane result, but that it could not be squared
with the present state of the law. Judge Spaeth noted that the lower court
had found that despite the defendant's bizarre behavior the record did not
show "a spirit of malevolence [or] hate." During the course of his
transvestitism the husband had told his wife that he loved her and his
daughter very much and he had worked hard to provide them with what
he could afford. Judge Spaeth resolved the dilemma by concluding,
contrary to the lower court and the majority, that "hate and estrange-
ment" need not be proved to support a charge of indignities.
Judge Spaeth also discussed at length whether the defendant could
be held responsible for his conduct or whether mental illness was a
defense to the indignities alleged. Noting that the standard should be
"whether, under all these circumstances, including [the defendant's]
mental derangement as and if the jury sees it, it would be just to hold [the
defendant] accountable,"- 31 Judge Spaeth felt that despite any mental
derangement on the part of the defendant, the divorce should be granted:
Taking into account all of the circumstances, [the
defendant] will not be unjustly treated if held accountable for
his conduct. True, he has suffered from a mental derangement,
and this weighs against holding him accountable. This circum-
stance, however, is more than balanced by the others. Because
of [the defendant's] conduct, the marital relationship has been
destroyed; a divorce will recognize this destruction. In thus
freeing the parties from the bonds of a stifling relationship, [the
defendant] will not be treated with undue severity; he is and has
been physically and financially independent. 
32
It is interesting to note that the final thought of Judge Spaeth was that
the defendant, if divorced, will not be left destitute since he was the wage
earner. Actually, under the present divorce code there is no room for such
a consideration. If the party is at fault, the divorce will be granted and
alimony will be denied regardless of the number of years the parties have
been married and even if the defendant will become a ward of the state.
Financial exigencies pose a serious problem under Pennsylvania's
fault divorce law. A judge may wish to grant the divorce to the plaintiff so
that he can begin a new life and end a hopeless, destroyed marriage. At
the same time, the judge realizes that if he grants a divorce the plaintiff
cannot be required to support his ex-spouse who, though at fault, may be
29. Id. at 82, 357 A.2d at 678.
30. Id. at 83, 357 A.2d at 678.
31. Id. at 99-100, 357 A.2d at 687, quoting Commonwealth v. Simms, 228 Pa. Super.
Ct. 85, I1, 324 A.2d 365, 385 (1974).
32. Id. at 102, 357 A.2d at 688-89 (emphasis added).
left destitute. The judge is not always allowed the comfort of knowing
that the party seeking the divorce is the one who is financially dependent
upon the other spouse, as was the case in Steinke. 
33
Practically speaking, this problem is often solved by the defendant's
contesting the divorce until plaintiff agrees to enter into a favorable
property settlement agreement. The result is that the vast majority of
divorces in Pennsylvania are uncontested, the parties having reached a
property settlement agreement prior to the hearing. One may not infer that
these uncontested divorces are collusive. The plaintiff is still required to
set forth a cause of action, but is not required to answer for his conduct in
the uncontested hearing, something he would have to do in a contested
divorce with resultant uncertainty as to the outcome.
The property settlement agreement that results from these negotia-
tions is often not satisfactory. For example, a husband agrees to pay his
wife a certain amount per month so long as she lives or until she
remarries, a typical provision in a marital property settlement. The
husband is under no order of court requiring him to make the payment.
What exists is simply a contract between the parties. If the husband
defaults, the wife must institute an action, either at law or in equity, to
obtain the money due. The unsatisfactory result that such a contract
action can have is evidenced by Commonwealth ex rel. Jones v. Jones, 
34
in which a husband had entered into an agreement, but then put all his
assets beyond the reach of creditors. The wife obtained valid judgments
against the husband for the amount due under the terms of the agreement,
but there was no way that she could enforce them.
The supreme court dealt with this problem of unenforceable marital
property settlements in Commonwealth ex rel. Silvestri v. Slatkowski. 35
The court held that the wife had a right to proceed with an action in equity
to compel specific performance of a property settlement agreement. The
court specifically noted, however, that it was not deciding whether the
husband could be held in contempt if he failed to perform the agreement.
The most useful resource in enforcing the duty of support, wage attach-
ment, which is permitted under the Pennsylvania Civil Procedural Sup-
port Law,36 is specifically not available to the wife under these circum-
stances. The duty of support that arises out of an agreement upon divorce
is merely contractual, not statutory.
Because of the problems just discussed, those interested in divorce
reform are presently urging significant amendment of the Pennsylvania
divorce law. Senate Bills 342 and 404, which are introduced in the 1977
session of the Pennsylvania legislature," 7 were in large part the result of
33. Steinke v. Steinke, 238 Pa. Super. Ct. 74, 357 A.2d 674 (1975).
34. 216 Pa. Super. Ct. 1, 260 A.2d 809 (1969).
35. 423 Pa. 498, 224 A.2d 212 (1966).
36. PA, STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 2043.39 (Purdon 1968).
37. Pa. S.B. 342, 161st Sess. (1977); Pa. S.B. 404, 161st Sess. (1977).
drafting done by the Family Law Section of the Pennsylvania Bar Associ-
ation. The bills provide that, in addition to all the present grounds for
divorce in Pennsylvania, a divorce could be obtained if a husband and
wife have lived separate and apart in different habitations for at least one
year and the court, after a hearing, determines that there is no reasonable
prospect of reconciliation. The bills further provide that if there are any
minor children of the marriage or the defendant denies the allegation that
there is no reasonable prospect of reconciliation, the court may order
counseling for a period not to exceed three months to enable the parties to
effect a reconciliation. If, at the expiration of that period, the parties have
not reconciled, the court shall determine that there is no reasonable
prospect of reconciliation. The only defenses to this ground for divorce
are that the parties have not lived separate and apart for at least twenty-
four months or that there is reasonable prospect of reconciliation.
The other significant change in the present Pennsylvania divorce law
that the bills would effect would be the allowance of permanent alimony.
To determine the nature and amount of alimony, if any, the court would
be required to consider all relevant factors, including the earnings and
earning abilities of the parties, the ages of the parties, the duration of the
marriage and the relative assets, liabilities and needs of the parties. The
fault of the parties is not to be considered.
Advocates of divorce reform in Pennsylvania, such as Professor
Henry H. Foster of the New York University School of Law, have also
urged reforms affecting distribution of marital property upon divorce.
The amended version of Senate Bill 404 provides for equitable division of
all marital property. At present, however, Pennsylvania is one of a
handful of states that follow the pure common-law property system
permitting division of only the jointly-owned property upon divorce.
38
The majority of American jurisdictions either have community property
law (9 states) or grant the divorce court discretion to make an equitable
distribution of both separate and jointly-held property (37 states). These
latter states vary as to what is deemed to be marital property or subject to
division. The major difference is whether or not separate property owned
before marriage is included within the property subject to distribution by
the divorce court.
An excellent example of a modern and equitable approach to dis-
tribution is found in the Delaware Divorce and Annulment Law, which
grants the court in a proceeding for divorce or annulment the power to
distribute virtually all property acquired by either party during the mar-
38. Remarks of Professor Henry H. Foster, Matrimonial Law: State of Disunion,
1976, before the Family Law Section of Pennsylvania Bar Association, July 9, 1976. The
only other pure common law states are Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, New York, Rhode
Island,-South Carolina, Virginia and West Virginia. In Alabama, North Carolina and Ohio, a
court may order alimony paid out of the spouse's separate property. In Maryland, only
personalty is subject to equitable distribution upon divorce.
riage. 39 It can distribute the property regardless of whether title was held
individually or in some form of co-ownership such as joint tenancy,
tenancy in common or tenancy by the entireties. The presumption that
property acquired during marriage is marital property is overcome only
by showing that it was obtained in exchange for property held prior to
marriage, was excluded by a valid agreement of the parties, or repre-
sented an increase in the value of property acquired prior to marriage.
Having determined that it is marital property, the court must then con-
sider factors similar to those proposed in the divorce bill drafted by the
Pennsylvania Bar Association: the length of the marriage, the relative
financial status of the parties, the contribution of the parties to the
acquisition and preservation of the marital property, and whether the
property itself was acquired by gift or devise.
4 0
The Delaware Divorce and Annulment Law also gives the courts
power to ensure that any alimony award will be enforceable and that the
party receiving the award will not be left destitute if the payor dies. 41 The
court has the right to impose a lien or charge upon marital property
distributed to the payor as security for payment. Furthermore, the court
can direct the continued maintenance of existing life insurance policies
insuring the life of either party and forbid changes in the designation of
beneficiaries. All of these powers allow the court to make an equitable
distribution of property and avoid the injustice that can arise if one party
who contributed to the acquisition of assets is ignorant of the fact that
they were titled in the sole name of the other spouse. At the same time,
the Delaware law does not automatically require that the court award
one-half of the joint assets to each spouse if the court believes that one
made a more significant contribution to the acquisition of those assets
than did the other.
IV. National Trends in Divorce
The fault concept in Pennsylvania follows the trend of nineteenth
century and early twentieth century divorce law in the United States. As
discussed above, this concept has now been abandoned by all but three
states. For the past three decades there has been a strong trend away from
the traditional notion that one spouse must be guilty of some injury to the
other before a divorce may be granted. When the states began to adopt
so-called "no fault" statutes, they set different standards upon which a
divorce could be granted.
California, for example, declares that a divorce may be granted if
there are "irreconcilable differences which have caused the irremediable
39. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1513 (Supp. 1976).
40. Id. § 1513(a); Pa. S.B. 342, 161st Sess. (1977); Pa. S.B. 404, 161st Sess. (1977).
41. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1513 (Supp. 1976).
breakdown of the marriage. "42 Other states allow a decree of dissolution
when "the marriage is irretreviably broken, 4 3 or "when there has been a
breakdown of the marriage relationship to the extent that the legitimate
objects of marriage have been destroyed and there remains no reasonable
likelihood that the marriage can be preserved. '"I Nevada and New
Mexico allow divorces for mere "incompatability," 45 and Alabama simi-
larly permits divorce if there is "a complete incompatibility of
temperament." 4 6
It is apparent that all these "no-fault" statutes say, in effect, that if
the court determines that the marriage relationship between the parties is
over, then a divorce should be decreed. The concept underlying these
statutes is that a unilateral decision by one spouse that the marriage is
over would so destroy the marriage relationship as to justify divorce.
Another group of states takes a different approach to divorce without
fault. These states recognize that a marriage has no reason for further
existence when the parties have lived separate and apart for a prescribed
period without cohabitation. The time period varies from six months in
Montana and Vermont to five years in Idaho and Rhode Island.47 It
should be noted that living apart for the prescribed period is the sole basis
upon which the marriage is dissolved-there is no requirement that the
separation be consensual.
Some state legislatures have felt that with the passage of no-fault
provisions there is no purpose in retaining fault grounds. Other states take
the view that there is justification for retaining the fault provisions since
some parties will not wish to wait the time required by the statute to
dissolve the marriage on the basis of living separate and apart.
The most common fault ground among all states is adultery, which
thirty-two states have retained.48 Twenty-eight states still permit divorce
42. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4508 (West 1970). Similar grounds for divorce are available in
Idaho, Maine, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oregon and Rhode Island.
43. Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Kentucky,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska and Washington. See FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 401:0001
et seq. (Ref. file 1977).
44. IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.17 (West Supp. 1976). Michigan and Missouri have similar
statutory provisions.
45. NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.010(10) (1969); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-7-1.8 (1954).
46. ALA. CODE tit. 34, § 20.7 (Supp. 1973).
47. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 48-316(b)(1) (Supp. 1975); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §
551(7) (1974); IDAHO CODE § 32-610 (1974); R.I. GEN- LAWS § 15-5-2 (1970). Nevada, North
Carolina, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Georgia have provisions for living one year separate and
apart. Connecticut and New Jersey have separation periods of eighteen months. Hawaii,
Montana, Ohio, Tennessee, the District of Columbia and West Virginia have a twenty-four
month period. Maryland, South Carolina, and Texas have a three year period. See FAM. L.
REP. (BNA) 401:0001 et seq. (Ref. file 1977).
48. Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Mary-
land, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Caro-
if one spouse willfully deserts the other. 9 The vast majority of these
states declare that a one-year desertion suffices. Maine requires, how-
ever, that desertion be for a period of three years, 50 and Pennsylvania and
New Hampshire require a two-year desertion period.51 Other common
grounds for divorce in state statutes include impotency, conviction of a
felony, sodomy, habitual drunkenness or addiction to drugs, incurable
insanity, pregnancy at the time of the marriage, cruelty, and gross
neglect.52
V. Conclusion
The opponents of divorce reform in the United States continue to
contend that "no-fault" provisions make it too simple for one party to
end the marriage. The strong countervailing argument to this point of
view is found in the time requirements of most "no-fault" divorce
statutes. It is difficult to sustain the position that divorce is simple and
lina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin
and Wyoming. See FAM, L. REP. (BNA) 401:0001 et seq. (Ref. file 1977).
49. Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Maine, Mary-
land, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico,
New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, West Virginia and Wisconsin. See FAM. L. REP.
(BNA) 401:0001 et seq. (Ref. file 1977).
50. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 691 (West 1965).
51. PA. SrAT. ANN, tit. 23, § 10 (Purdon 1955); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:7 (1968).
52. The incurable impotency of the defendant at the time of marriage is a ground for
the dissolution of marriage in Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Mary-
land, Massachusetts, Mississippi, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, Tennessee, Utah and Wyoming.
Conviction of a felony or imprisonment for various causes for an extended period of
time is a ground for divorce in Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana,
Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming.
Sodomy is a ground for divorce in Alabama, North Carolina and Virginia.
Habitual drunkenness or being addicted to alcohol or drugs is a ground for divorce in
Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Mississippi, New Hampshire,. New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, South.Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, West Virginia, Wisconsin
and Wyoming.
Incurable insanity or confinement to a mental institution for a certain period of time is a
ground for divorce in Aiabama, California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nevada, New Jersey,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia and
Wisconsin.
The pregnancy of the wife at the time of her marriage is a ground for divorce in
Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Tennessee and Wyoming.
Cruelty is a ground for divorce in Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho,
Illinois, Kansas, Maine, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
Failure to adequately support a spouse or gross neglect is a ground for divorce in
Alabama, Arkansas, Idaho, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, North Dakota, Iowa, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Wisconsin and Wyoming. See FAM. L. REP. (BNA)
401:0001 et seq. (Ref. file 1977).
quick when the parties in most instances must have lived separate and
apart for at least one year. Logic and justice would favor that once
adequate and fair financial arrangements have been made, a marriage
should be ended if the parties have not maintained a common domicile for
twelve months.

